

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.163
4 February 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

APR 9 1964

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

(Nigeria)

64-04766

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. D. TEHOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON
U SEIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. T. LAHODA

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. M. IONESCU
Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. ISMAIL
Mr. AHMED OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir PAUL MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The general debate with which the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee opened has proved useful. It has not only made clearer the positions of the States represented in the Committee: during this debate it has been confirmed almost unanimously that the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control remains the main and most important task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, because the safeguarding of lasting peace on earth depends on general and complete disarmament. The debate has also shown that the interest taken in various proposals in the field of "collateral measures" and the efforts aimed at reaching agreement on some of them should, it is generally recognized, not only not distract our attention from the Committee's main task, but, on the contrary, should help us to bring about a decisive change in our negotiations and facilitate the adoption of a draft agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria welcomed with satisfaction the proposal (ENDC/PV.157, p.38) that every first meeting in the week should be devoted to the discussion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, as well as the agreement to resume discussion of the question of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The decisive significance of the latter problem was stressed repeatedly both at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and in the course of our general debate here in the Committee. Many delegations, including those of the Western countries, have emphasized that if the question of the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- that is, the question of nuclear disarmament -- were to find a mutually-acceptable solution, it would undoubtedly be possible to take a decisive step forward and thus facilitate agreement on a number of other problems connected with a treaty on general and complete disarmament; it would be possible to get the negotiations on this question out of the impasse in which, unfortunately, they have been for nearly two years.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Meanwhile, to judge by the statements that were made in the United Nations General Assembly and that are now being made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the greatest unanimity appears to exist precisely in regard to the urgent need for general and complete disarmament. Everyone will remember, for instance, that when just over four years ago the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, made from the rostrum of the General Assembly his well-known proposal on general and complete disarmament (A/PV.799, paras. 90,91) and submitted on behalf of the Soviet Government a concrete draft treaty (A/4219), there were still people who asserted that disarmament was an illusion, that it was in the nature of man to make war, and that wars would be waged even without modern weapons, even if only knives or sticks had to be used. Today those assertions, to put it mildly, look frivolous and belong to the past. Such arguments are hardly ever heard today, and if they are, it is difficult to find anyone to take them seriously. On the contrary, the conviction prevails that the most stable peace will be peace in a world in which there will be no weapons except those required for maintaining internal order in the different States.

The representative of the United States of America has reminded us here (ENDC/PV.162, p.17) of one of the statements of President Kennedy, made two months before his tragic death, in which he said that an armaments race could not guarantee security. We recall yet another statement of the late President Kennedy, made earlier, in which he clearly emphasized the necessity of destroying armaments, saying that unless that is done they will destroy us.

It is well known that this has been the conviction of all the socialist countries since the day they came into being. Thus, all those who are interested in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament -- and they are hundreds of millions of people -- cannot fail to ask themselves the question why, when there is such complete unanimity in regard to the need to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee has made hardly any progress at all on that issue.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It is particularly difficult to explain the insignificant progress made in our work in respect of the problem of eliminating the nuclear danger. The Bulgarian delegation wishes to deal with this question in greater detail. We wish to emphasize once more the importance we attach to the problem of really eliminating the danger of a nuclear-missile war as quickly as possible, in the very first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament. We all remember that in the course of the work of our Committee, and outside it in certain circles, the concept has been defended that the best guarantee of the security of the peoples and of averting a thermonuclear war, even during the implementation of general and complete disarmament, is the so-called "deterrent effect" of nuclear weapons, or the "balance of fear".

By way of counterbalance to this concept the socialist delegations have always defended the thesis that the very possibility of waging a nuclear war must be eliminated, and that this elimination would be the best guarantee of the security of the peoples. We hope that the time has passed when groundless arguments were stubbornly opposed to this thesis, when it was necessary to argue whether it would be better to start disarmament by eliminating the nuclear danger in one way or another, or whether it would be better to "guarantee" peace and the security of the peoples throughout the process of disarmament -- and possibly even after that -- by means of the threat of a nuclear war. We hope, I repeat, such a "philosophy" of disarmament will be rejected once and for all.

In the late President Kennedy's statement which Mr. Foster quoted we saw evidence that an ever-increasing number of responsible people in the West realize the absurdity of the "theory" that it is possible to avoid a thermonuclear war by means of a frenzied race in the field of nuclear armaments.

We have on many occasions expressed the point of view of principle of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in regard to the necessity of destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament. We are, and have always been,

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in favour of destroying the nuclear weapons themselves. Since, however, in the course of the negotiations it became apparent that the Western Powers were not prepared to start destroying nuclear weapons in the first stage, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that a start should be made by destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In our debates on that issue several delegations were able to prove the appropriateness and realistic nature of that method -- even though an indirect one -- of eliminating the nuclear danger. It seems to us that our Western colleagues themselves have in principle admitted that the "neutralization" of nuclear weapons is an effective approach to the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear missile war. Moreover, it is well known that the idea of using this approach was put forward in the beginning by one of the Western countries.

What were the main objections to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament? Allow me to deal with two of the arguments which, it seems to us, the representative of the Western Powers dwelt on most often.

First, it was asserted that the existence of the means of delivering nuclear weapons -- that is, the possibility of delivering a nuclear blow -- would be a guarantee that during the process of disarmament peace would not be violated. In other words, the possibility of delivering a nuclear blow was regarded by some people as an essential prerequisite for the implementation of the process of general and complete disarmament. Moreover, they insisted that this possibility should be granted to those international forces which were to be established for the maintenance of peace not only during the process of general and complete disarmament, but even after its implementation.

One may well ask, incidentally: does not such a view mean that mankind had to wait until the invention of nuclear weapons before disarmament became possible at all? Of course, one can find dialectical truth in the contention that the invention of nuclear weapons has transformed war with the use of them into such a tremendous catastrophe for all mankind that war negates itself. But

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in this truth one must see the imperative need to destroy these dangerous weapons, and not to draw the conclusion that the more there are of such weapons and the more they are perfected, the better it will be for the cause of peace.

I should like to repeat that we are in favour of the total destruction of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all means of delivery of such weapons before the weapons themselves are completely destroyed. However, for the sake of achieving an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament, a certain strictly-defined number of individual types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could be retained during the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

Another objection to the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage was based on the contention that this would upset the so-called "balance of forces" to the detriment of the West during the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. The representatives of certain Western Powers made many efforts to prove that the implementation of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union was unacceptable to them because the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had some sort of superiority in conventional arms and armed forces, because those countries had the possibility of rapidly concentrating their armed forces, manpower resources and so forth. As is well known, the most responsible institutions of the Western Powers have recently declared that these arguments ignore the facts and disregard the truth. In any case, however, the question of retaining nuclear weapons, or rather, the question of maintaining a "nuclear umbrella" until a later stage in the process of disarmament as a means of maintaining the "balance", has been raised by the Western delegations.

How should the Western Powers' main objections to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage be viewed today after the proposal made by the Soviet Government at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71) that a limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles be retained at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States of America,

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solely in their own territories, until the end of the third stage -- that is, until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament? We consider that the new Soviet proposal makes the aforementioned objections of the Western Powers quite groundless.

So that this may become even more clear, I will quote from a statement made by the United Kingdom representative at our meeting on 14 December 1962. Here is what Mr. Godber said:

"Therefore I was very happy when the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the General Assembly in New York, made the proposal to carry on certain nuclear delivery vehicles from the first stage to the second (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38). It seemed to me that that was a move in the right direction. However, as Sir Michael Wright pointed out in his statement to this Committee on Monday, from the United Kingdom point of view, although this is a step in the right direction, it does not go far enough. We believe that it would be necessary to retain into the third stage, rather than merely into the second, some measure such as the Soviet Union now proposes." (ENDC/PV.92, p.26).

Further on, Mr. Godber dealt with the necessity of establishing effective peace-keeping institutions before starting on more radical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. He said:

"It was for this reason that the United Kingdom delegation felt and still feels that it is logical and right that some degree of nuclear deterrent should remain in the hands of both sides until the later part of the disarmament process. I do put this to our Soviet colleagues very seriously as a matter of very considerable importance." (Ibid., p.27).

The aforesaid statement of the United Kingdom delegation reflects, among other things, the history of this problem. In its desire to achieve agreement on some of the main issues of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government once more showed good will and a spirit of compromise in spite of the lack of foundation of the objections and fears expressed by the Western delegations. This gives us reason to hope that the Western countries will show the same good will and will make efforts towards a constructive discussion and solution of this problem which is of such importance for the success of our negotiations.

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During the last two weeks of our general debate many delegations have stressed the importance of the proposal made by the Soviet delegation at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I shall not dwell on the appraisals given to this proposal at the General Assembly by a large number of delegations, including representatives of countries which are members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, such as the representatives of Burma, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, Nigeria and others.

It is evident that at the present time there are considerable possibilities for reaching agreement on this key problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have, for their part, shown readiness to take into consideration the views and fears of the Western States -- views and fears which, in their opinion, make it necessary to accept the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process.

At the same time all the prerequisites exist for finding solutions to problems connected with control. As Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, said on 19 September 1963,

"From the very outset of the second stage, control should be instituted over the remaining rockets as well as over their nuclear warheads."

(A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71)

The representative of the Soviet Union explained at our meeting held on 21 January:

"It should be pointed out that, under the Soviet Union's proposal, all the missiles retained by the Soviet Union and the United States would be placed under control, including direct control at the launching sites, until they are destroyed when general and complete disarmament has been accomplished." (ENDC/PV.157, p.15)

Consequently there can be no doubt that the achievement of agreement on this question would at once facilitate the solution of many other problems on which there has been no agreement so far, such as the time limit for each stage, the over-all time limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the size of the reduction of armaments and armed forces at each particular stage, and so forth.

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The question of the elimination of military bases in foreign territories would also arise in an altogether new light. In fact, once the desired balance has been achieved, such bases would lose the reason for their existence which their creators ascribe to them. From a practical viewpoint, these bases would cease to be of any importance, the need for them -- which, by the way, does not exist even now -- would completely disappear and it would be impossible to justify in any way their further existence. We are convinced that it will be easier to solve many other outstanding problems as soon as the Committee reaches agreement on the question of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war right from the beginning of the process of disarmament.

Therefore the Bulgarian delegation, as it has stated in the general debate, expects to hear the delegations of the Western countries give a positive opinion on the new Soviet proposal and express their agreement with it. We hope that this point of view will be expressed in the near future because, as several delegations have already emphasized, that will make it possible for us to take an important and decisive step forward in our work in regard to agreeing on the measures to be provided for in the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened very carefully to the thoughtful address which has just been given by the representative of Bulgaria. Many of the things he said are worthy of careful consideration, which we intend to give them, and we may at a later date have something to say about some of his remarks and suggestions. The Canadian delegation believes -- as the Bulgarian delegation has stated it also believes -- that general and complete disarmament is the prime object of our work here. We further believe that we should be able to make considerable progress on this task if we approach our problems in the right way.

When this Conference began two years ago we spent a good deal of effort in drafting texts and debating various aspects of a treaty in detail. I do not suggest that that work was not useful, but I agree with the view which the representative of Burma expressed at our meeting on 30 January (ENDC/PV.161, p.9):

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that it would be inadvisable at this time to recommence elaborating formal treaty language on the aspects of general and complete disarmament. We must of course continue working, without slackening our efforts, at our main task of reaching agreement on a total disarmament programme; but for this task we must use methods which would be most likely to produce results.

The representative of Bulgaria devoted quite a portion of his speech to discussion of the proposals made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1208, Provisional pp.67 et seq.), and most delegations here in their statements in the general debate have expressed interest in those proposals. Those proposals, as we all know, are to the effect that the Soviet Union and the United States should keep a minimum force of intercontinental ballistic missiles, plus certain anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, until the last stage of disarmament. All concerned have agreed that this is a forward move on the part of the Soviet Union. But I think we would also agree that we still have a good deal of ground to cover before the Powers that possess nuclear weapon vehicles and nuclear weapons will be able to agree on how they will divest themselves of this kind of armament.

Last year, in connexion with Mr. Gromyko's first proposal, made at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1127, para. 75-77), the delegation of the Soviet Union insisted that there should be agreement in principle on it before there was any extended discussion of the way in which it was to be implemented or exactly what it meant in numerical or quantitative terms (ENDC/PV.83, pp.22 et seq.). We have heard again this year that we should "agree in principle" before discussing details. These remarks by the representatives of Czechoslovakia (ENDC/PV.158, p.17) and of Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.159, p.23) in their statements in the general debate were not specifically linked to the Gromyko proposals — and we hope that the attitude in discussing Mr. Gromyko's 1963 proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) will not be the same as before. We are all aware that "agreement in principle" is usually one of the stages in any negotiation. I hope it will not be considered too negative if I say that sometimes negotiations come to a stop at this point.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It is often more difficult to agree on particulars than on a principle —, particularly if the principle has been expressed in sufficiently vague language. Experience has shown that any negotiators or diplomats who agree in principle, subject to the negotiation of particulars later, often find that no agreement can be reached on those particulars. Then, when they state that they cannot come to an agreement, they are reproached for having broken an agreement — an "agreement in principle".

The Canadian delegation thinks that there is already a certain amount of agreement in principle on the question of abolishing nuclear weapon vehicles. It is agreed that the reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles is the most important and probably the most difficult sector of the disarmament process. It is agreed that they should all be done away with in the final stage of disarmament. It is agreed that some nuclear weapon vehicles should be kept until the final stage, to guard against bad faith on the part of any nuclear Power — that is, concealing and failing to destroy such a number of nuclear weapon vehicles as would give it a military advantage over other parties that had disarmed in accordance with their obligations. It would also guard against the possibility of some irresponsible fourth, fifth or n-th nation clandestinely arming itself with nuclear weapons and means of delivering them and then creating trouble.

It is agreed that measures of disarmament affecting nuclear weapon vehicles must be under effective international control. It is agreed that no measure should give a military advantage to one side or the other, and this implies that disarmament measures affecting nuclear weapon vehicles must be related to those for conventional disarmament. If, in the later stages of disarmament, after significant reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles, one side were left with too powerful conventional forces, it might be tempted to make use of these to gain political ends.

I have mentioned a number of matters of principle relating to nuclear weapon vehicle reduction and abolition on which I believe all parties here are in agreement. There are a number of other points, however, where we do not appear to be in agreement in principle or otherwise. There is no agreement that all nuclear weapon vehicles except 10X or 100X on each side should be abolished in the first stage of disarmament. As we have not examined the Gromyko proposals with regard

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to the phasing and timing of the destruction or dismantling of nuclear weapon vehicles, or how this is to be verified to the satisfaction of all parties, we cannot be said to agree on these questions in principle or otherwise.

The United States proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/120) if accepted, might enable us to make a start on the process of reduction and final elimination of these powerful armaments. Once numbers and characteristics were frozen, then a plan might be worked out for dismantling them over specified periods of time. Any such plan must show how the rates of dismantling by the several nuclear Powers are related, until the stage before final abolition is reached.

I should like to say a few words on a subject which is perhaps related — about the habit, which seems to have grown up in this Conference and elsewhere, of referring to the Gromyko proposals as concerned with a "nuclear umbrella". Metaphors are often helpful in enabling an audience to grasp certain ideas, but we should be sure that the metaphors we use are truly applicable and appropriate. An umbrella, as everyone knows, is to keep off the rain, and it is therefore a strictly defensive mechanism. On the other hand, intercontinental ballistic missiles — whether they are many or few — are not able to keep off other intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they are strictly offensive weapons. Their use is as a deterrent, and they deter by the unspoken threat "If you hit me with your nuclear missiles, I will hit you back". Thus these intercontinental ballistic missiles — and indeed other long-range nuclear weapon vehicles — resemble not an umbrella but rather a club or cudgel: "I have my club and you have yours, and if you hit me I will hit you". Of course the Canadian delegation agrees that the fewer clubs of this kind there are the better, but I think we should remember in this Conference that a nuclear missile is a nuclear missile — to paraphrase Gertrude Stein — and is not anything like an umbrella, which is a harmless, necessary invention. I hope I shall be excused for this digression.

The Canadian delegation believes that, as the Conference has progressed, we have become increasingly realistic about how to accomplish our main tasks. The most important aspect of our work is to determine how to get the disarmament process going — how to begin to move towards our eventual goal. Last year the Conference helped to give birth to three specific agreements between the United States and the

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Soviet Union. Our present round of negotiations has started off in a way which gives some hope that we may be able to achieve additional concrete steps forward.

The Canadian delegation welcomes particularly the important message of President Johnson of 21 January (ENDC/120), and the five proposals therein advanced by the United States Government. I will not discuss at the present time the Canadian attitude towards the substance of these proposals. We welcome both their broad range and their forward-looking nature. The United States proposals follow the pattern of the three agreements adopted last year. Some would carry forward into new areas the approach exemplified in the partial test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the resolution prohibiting orbit of mass-destruction weapons in outer space (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117).

The proposal for a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons vehicles -- which I have just mentioned -- would help to halt the arms race in this crucial area in two different ways: first, it would halt further stock-piling of such weapons; and secondly, it would prevent the development of new and more deadly types. Like the agreement on a direct communications link (ENDC/97), the United States proposals concerning ground observation posts do not involve actual measures of disarmament, but they could help to improve the atmosphere and assist towards a better understanding of intentions. Still others of the United States proposals would involve concrete measures of disarmament such as the destruction of certain types of bomber aircraft, and the cut-off and transfer of fissionable material to non-weapons uses.

Looking also at the list of nine proposals advanced by Mr. Tsarapkin at our meeting of 28 January (ENDC/PV.160, pp.5 et seq.; ENDC/123), we find that there are measures coming under the same heading in the Soviet Union proposals and in those put forward by the United States -- although, of course, this is far from saying that the two sides are agreed on the real content and scope of the measures referred to.

The Soviet Union proposes an agreement, prior to general and complete disarmament, on measures helping to freeze the arms race in certain respects -- for example, an agreement to reduce military expenditures. The Soviet Union also proposes an agreement which, in its view, could lessen international tension and thereby create a better atmosphere for disarmament negotiations. Further, the Soviet Union proposes measures of actual physical disarmament -- for example, reducing armed forces and destroying bomber aircraft.

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We are therefore hopeful that certain common proposals leading towards new agreements can be selected from those two lists. One example is the physical destruction of bombers. Such an agreement, even if beginning on a modest basis, could be built upon and serve as a nucleus for more far-reaching disarmament proposals leading to a programme for general disarmament. We share the hope the representative of Burma expressed on 30 January:

"... we may be witnessing the beginning of something which we have long believed to be possible and for which we have been pressing ever since the change for the better in the political atmosphere." (ENDC/PV.161,p.7)

The proposals of the United States and of the Soviet Union for limited disarmament measures preceding general and complete disarmament are encouraging because they follow the principle contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles negotiated over two years ago by the United States and the Soviet Union. As members of the Committee will recall, this paragraph provided as follows:

"States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament" -- we might underline the word "disarmament" -- "should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme." (ENDC/5, p.3)

I should like in concluding to quote the remarks made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 28 January. She said:

"... there are at hand such proposals as those of a 'freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles'; of a halt to the 'production of fissionable materials for weapons use' ... of actual physical 'destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles' as proposed specifically hitherto by the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.157, p.23); and of a 'reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States' ..., to quote one from the long list suggested by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"In this category of unconnected and thus truly 'partial' measures, I submit that we should move forward following a very simple pragmatic guide-line: that is, trying to reach agreement first on whatever is easiest to achieve." (ENDC/PV.160, p.21)

I should like to say that the Canadian delegation fully subscribes to these ideas.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we are taking up the question of general and complete disarmament; or rather, we are resuming our discussion of this subject.

The elaboration of an agreement on this question is the main task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The importance of solving this problem has been stressed, during the general debate to which we have devoted the past two weeks of the Committee's work, by the representatives of Burma, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, Ethiopia and India, and by the delegations of all the socialist countries.

We note with satisfaction the growing number of those who understand the need to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war as a matter of priority in the process of general and complete disarmament. This is precisely what the peoples of the world desire. To them, general and complete disarmament means first and foremost the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

From the very outset of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Soviet Union has based itself on the assumption that, in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, the most important thing is to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. This can be accomplished if agreement is reached on the physical destruction of the means whereby such a war could be waged. The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) is based on the need to eliminate the nuclear danger as rapidly as possible by destroying the means of delivery of such weapons in the first stage and by destroying the nuclear warheads themselves in the second stage. I would recall that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree that the elimination of nuclear weapons should also be carried out in the first stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

What was the attitude of the Western Powers towards this approach? They preferred to keep the nuclear menace, and proposed a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Their disarmament programme provides for the elimination of the nuclear menace at the slowest possible rate, and in essence it means that the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war would be delayed until the last day of disarmament, if not longer. It is obvious to everyone that such a position cannot serve as a basis for agreement.

Desiring to facilitate the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in respect of the main question -- nuclear disarmament --, the Soviet Government expressed its agreement at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that, when the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are destroyed in the first stage, an exception should be made for a strictly limited, agreed number of nuclear missiles which would be at the disposal solely of the Soviet Union and the United States and in their own territories (ENDC/2/Rev.1). At the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Soviet Union went even further and announced (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71) its willingness to agree that a limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air missiles should remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States in their own territories, not only until the end of the second stage but until the end of the third stage, that is until the completion of the entire process of general and complete disarmament.

In submitting its proposal the Soviet Government described it with uttermost clarity, which should fully suffice to enable all parties to adopt it as a basis for the further elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Permit me to give some explanations of the motivation and content of our proposal both from the political and military point of view and from the point of view of the concrete form of this proposal in time and space, the control measures we envisage.

From the political point of view, the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States until the very end of the disarmament process of a definite, limited number of missiles -- what is called a "nuclear umbrella", a metaphor to which the Canadian representative has just taken exception (supra, p.15) --

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would create additional guarantees for the security of States, about the necessity for which the Western representatives have had a good deal to say.

The reason why we agree to the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" is that the Western Powers see some sort of menace to themselves in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the first and even in the second stages of disarmament, whereas an "umbrella" would somehow shelter them, and the whole subsequent process of disarmament from beginning to end would take place under its protection. If one were to place oneself in the position of a State which does not wish to renounce its nuclear weapons in the very first stage of disarmament because it fears it might be cheated by another State, the missiles retained by agreement would give such a State an extremely weighty guarantee of security in the form of the capacity to deal a nuclear counter-blow against an aggressor. An aggressor would not be able to destroy the means for dealing a counter-blow which would be retained by the other State, the victim of aggression, because in order to put a modern intercontinental missile out of action it is not enough to aim at it, say, one or even two or three intercontinental missiles.

Furthermore, and this is the important point, the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" should be considered not in isolation but in conjunction with other disarmament measures. Moreover, in the conditions in which the wide disarmament measures which the Soviet Union has proposed for the first and second stages would be carried out, and with the widespread control which would accompany these measures, it would in fact be impossible to conceal any significant quantity of weapons, even if one bases oneself on such a presumption, as the representatives of the Western Powers do.

In order that it may not be possible for the "nuclear umbrella" to serve the purposes of a war of aggression, the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a minimum quantity of missiles with nuclear warheads. That is why we propose to be guided in regard to the "umbrella" by the criterion of a "strictly limited number" of missiles. Having adopted this principle, the two sides will then have to agree on the specific number of missiles to be retained; in other words, we envisage conducting negotiations on this question with a view to agreeing on appropriate figures on the basis of the aforesaid principle. Until this criterion is adopted, the discussion of any figures would be useless and would give rise to lengthy and sterile technical arguments. It should be clear from our

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position that we have no intention of monopolizing the right to put forward specific figures in this field, and if the representatives of the Western Powers would, for their part, like to name straight away any figure or figures compatible with the aforementioned principle, this would be interpreted as a manifestation on the part of the Western Powers of their agreement; of course, we should welcome this and should readily begin negotiations on the types and numbers of the missiles to be retained by the two sides.

If the Soviet Union and the United States retained a limited number of missiles until the end of the disarmament process, the problem of mutual mistrust between the two sides during the disarmament process would be virtually eliminated. It is impossible to imagine that, if a "nuclear umbrella" existed, any State would venture to violate peace and embark on aggression. The aggressor would have to pay a high price for such an act. In this regard the situation is so clear that there is no need to go into further details. Another advantage of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is that it would eliminate any stimulus to conceal weapons during the disarmament process. After all, if an attempt to conceal weapons would involve an enormous risk of exposure, and the risk of unleashing a war with these weapons could not be taken because of their absolute quantitative insufficiency, and therefore these weapons could not be used, it is a matter of logic that there would be no sense in concealing weapons -- that is, perpetrating a violation of the treaty, with all the serious consequences that would entail for the violator.

The question of the means for maintaining peace during the disarmament process, to which some representatives attach particular importance, would also be very much simplified.

The problem of "maintaining the balance of forces" would be solved in quite a different way. What we are resolutely opposed to is that any State or group of States should obtain a military advantage during the process of disarmament. That is the premise on which our draft treaty is based. That is the correct and necessary approach.

But it is one thing not to allow any State to obtain unilateral military advantages, and quite another thing to try to maintain the balance of forces with such scrupulous apothecary's precision as would not lend itself to definition in

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practice. After all, it is impossible to speak of disarmament measures under the pretext of maintaining the so-called military balance. Moreover, where are the yardsticks, where are the scales on which it would be possible to weigh the armaments of the two sides in order to be sure that the balance is being maintained? If one were to set oneself such a task, it would be necessary right from the beginning of disarmament to establish control not only over all disarmament measures --- which is quite legitimate and necessary --- but also over all the armaments retained by States, which in itself would affect their security to a considerable degree. The entire economy of a country would in fact be placed under all-round foreign control. The absurdity of such an approach is, apparently, obvious to its authors themselves. All this shows that it is necessary to approach the problem of working out disarmament measures with firm principles.

This means that, in working out these measures, one should be guided not solely by the requirements of war departments or by the specific philosophy of generals concerning the maintenance of the military balance, but preference should be given to considerations for halting the armaments race, to the demands for a decisive reduction of the danger of a nuclear war, and to the interests of disarmament. In general, priority should be given to disarmament and not to any other considerations. One cannot allow speculation on the basis of the slogan of "maintaining the balance of forces"---that is, maintaining the ratio of qualitative and quantitative indices of armed forces and their structure --- because that would lead to undermining the cause of disarmament. Any attempt to subordinate actual disarmament to the concept of military balance would lead to a bog of endless unproductive disputes, arbitrary judgments and subjective conclusions. That, as we all know, led to the complete failure of the negotiations on disarmament in the League of Nations.

The Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" makes the talk of "maintaining the balance of forces" pointless, and thus puts an end to any attempt under this pretext to delay or postpone the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament.

From the specifically military point of view, the Soviet proposal indicates quite clearly the types of missiles which, in our opinion, should be included in the "nuclear umbrella". The Soviet Union proposes to retain, as a "protective umbrella", (1) intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would also be a deterrent,

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(2) anti-missile missiles, and (3) anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category. The two last-named categories of missiles are to be retained in case, as the Western Powers fear, anyone should attempt in violation of the treaty to conceal a certain number of missiles or bomber aircraft, or to adapt existing civil aircraft for an attack.

It would, of course, be premature at present to raise the question whether, let us say, the United States should retain in the category of anti-aircraft missiles the "Nike-Zeus" rocket or some other particular type of missile. In this regard what is important now is the principle. As soon as we can reach agreement on that, we do not think that it will be particularly difficult for the parties to agree on the type of missiles and their quantities.

Now about the time of the establishment of the "umbrella" and the time-limits for its existence. The "nuclear umbrella" would be at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States from the end of the first stage of disarmament, after the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons provided for by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). In this way "the umbrella" would be retained during the second and until the end of the third stage; that is, until the completion of the entire process of general and complete disarmament. Of course, by the end of the third stage the missiles and their nuclear warheads, as well as the launching pads, must be completely eliminated.

The missiles retained at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States must be located respectively in Soviet and United States territory only. Again, it would be senseless to try to discuss now precisely where and at which geographical points missile installations should be located; in any case this question is unlikely to give rise to any serious difficulties. But we deem it essential that the inadmissibility of locating nuclear weapons in foreign territories should be recognized. Look at the facts and you will see that the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons in foreign territories aggravates the international situation and increases the danger of war.

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In regard to control, the Soviet Government envisages that during the whole period of the existence of the "nuclear umbrella" strict control over it would be established. This control would come into operation from the very beginning of the second stage of disarmament and, as the Soviet delegation has already explained in the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/PV.114, p.40), would be established directly at the launching pads, the number of which should not be greater than the number of missiles retained. I doubt whether anyone would venture to assert that control based on the principle we propose would not be thorough.

As regards the problem of control in connexion with the establishment of the "umbrella", it should be pointed out that the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of limited quantities of nuclear weapons would facilitate the achievement of agreement in regard to control over the implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We have always believed and continue to believe that, for the implementation of the entire programme of disarmament, control over the destruction of armaments and the disbandment of armed forces are sufficient. The Western Powers put forward demands for verification of remaining armaments and armed forces. The arguments with which the Western Powers have tried to justify these demands have boiled down to the following: that unless there was verification of remaining armaments, arming might be concealed. I have already stated that, now that it is proposed to retain a "nuclear umbrella", these arguments become quite valueless.

Such is our proposal, which members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee can examine from any angle so as to convince themselves that nothing is hidden behind it and that there are no traps. What are the prospects opened up by this proposal in regard to solving our main problem, the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament?

The Soviet Government's proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles does away with the doubts and objections put forward by the Western Powers against our proposal for the elimination of the means of delivery in the first stage of disarmament. That proposal has created a possibility for solving a key problem of the programme of general and complete disarmament and bringing about a radical change in the work of the Committee on that programme.

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It should be pointed out that yet another argument advanced against our draft treaty has apparently now been eliminated: namely, that it is impossible to establish a clear distinction between means of delivery of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons. Efforts have been made to prove to us that between a strategic missile with a nuclear warhead and a simple machine-gun there are so many gradations that the transition from one category to another is imperceptible. We now have in the Committee a document submitted by the Western side which shows the far-fetched nature of such a point of view. I refer to President Johnson's message of 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120), in which strategic nuclear vehicles are treated as a special category of weapons distinct from all the rest. The Soviet delegation intends later to comment in greater detail on President Johnson's proposals, and for the time being we will only note that they have been drafted with due regard to the possibility of subdividing weapons into separate categories on the basis of their capability to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets. This is a positive change in opinion which allows us to hope for a more realistic approach by the Western Powers to the question of the physical destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The constructive significance of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is shown by the positive appraisal which it was given at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and in our Committee. This proposal was supported by the socialist States and by the representatives of a number of non-aligned States such as Burma, Cyprus, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Nigeria, Peru and the United Arab Republic, and was welcomed by some representatives of the Western Powers. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in his statement to the General Assembly on 1 October 1963, said:

"... I have given close attention to Mr. Gromyko's speech, and I welcome very much the constructive passages in it on disarmament, and particularly that passage in which he said that the Soviet Union would be willing to see a certain number of missiles retained on both sides in the third phase of disarmament. It removes, in my opinion, one of the objections to the proposals of 1962 made by the Soviet Union."

(A/PV.1222, provisional, p.28-30).

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The representative of India, Mrs. Pandit, speaking in the First Committee on 30 October 1963, emphasized that:

"Mr. Gromyko's agreement to the retention of a certain number of missiles by the two great Powers to the end of the last stage of disarmament, made in his speech before the General Assembly, is the most significant development on the disarmament plan this year."

(A/C.1/PV.1321, p.37)

The remarks made by the representative of India in this Committee, Mr. Nehru (ENDC/PV.162, p.13), were also favourable to our proposal.

We noted with satisfaction the appreciation of the "nuclear umbrella" by the representative of Sweden in the First Committee, Mr. Sohlman. We hope that his opinion is shared by Mrs. Myrdal. I will recall that on 30 October 1963 Mr. Sohlman stated:

"... the most important new element, introducing a fundamental change in the very perspective under which we have to perceive the disarmament process, has, it seems to our delegation, been brought about by the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the concept of the 'nuclear umbrella' ...

"First and foremost, it provides military security for the main parties, thereby engendering political confidence. As a consequence, the disarmament process need no longer be considered as an 'open-end proposition', the 'risk' taken in entering upon an agreement to disarm being considerably reduced for the world Powers. This would, eo ipso, eliminate their reasons for hesitating to make an initial commitment about disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.1321, p.56)

I will not take up the Committee's time any further by quoting from many other authoritative statements in support of our proposal. It seems to us that the attitude of the majority to this proposal was most clearly and convincingly expressed by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, in his statement of 30 January 1964 when he said:

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"The offer of the Soviet Union to extend the so-called nuclear umbrella to the end of the third stage of the disarmament plan (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71) constitutes, in our view, the most important move that has yet been made in the field of nuclear disarmament since the Soviet and United States disarmament plans were submitted at the beginning of the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We believe it to be the urgent task of our Committee to explore the possibilities of advance which this move opens up." (ENDC/PV.161, p.8)

However, in the general chorus of welcome and support for the Soviet Union's proposal for the retention of a limited number of missiles in the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States during the entire disarmament process, some other notes can be heard. The representatives of some States claim that our proposal requires certain clarifications and greater precision. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, at present it would be more appropriate to clarify and give greater precision to the position of those States themselves in regard to the Soviet proposal: do they agree with it, do they agree with what we propose, or have they certain opinions and reservations? If everyone is in agreement with our proposal, let us record this agreement and then we can pass on to clarifying the details. If anyone has his own particular views on any aspect of our proposal, let us examine and discuss them. But until we reach agreement in principle on the substance of the proposal to retain a "nuclear umbrella", we shall not be able to make any progress.

When the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumed its work, Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, reminded us of what the late President Kennedy had said:

"Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us". (ENDC/PV.157, p.8)

Mr. Foster then informed us of President Johnson's intention to carry on the policies of the Kennedy Administration. Any attempt to start going into details in the absence of agreement on the main point would be contrary to that line, since it would lead to widening the differences between us and not to our moving forward. A discussion on such a plane and in such circumstances would inevitably lead not to our coming closer together but to our finding ourselves further apart from each other.

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The Soviet delegation considers that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should make every effort to reach agreement on the question of the "nuclear umbrella". The Soviet delegation is ready to carry out a serious and businesslike discussion, and the first step in such a discussion should be the establishment of a common platform. Then we shall have a solid basis on which to discuss from the practical viewpoint all the derivative questions, details and particulars. But first we must find a common language, a common platform, and agree on the general principle; then a constructive dialogue on details will become possible.

In accordance with the new proposal submitted by Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly concerning the duration of the existence of the "nuclear umbrella" (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71), the delegation of the Soviet Union is submitting for consideration by the Committee some additions and amendments to the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. I request the Secretariat to issue these amendments as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.^{1/}

We appeal to all members of the Committee to adopt a positive attitude and to take advantage of the favourable conditions in which the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has started, so that we may solve as soon as possible the problem of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and advance the cause of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I have listened this morning with great interest to the remarks of the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada and the Soviet Union. I can assure the Committee that we will give the most careful attention to these remarks and will comment on them at a later meeting.

Today we came primarily to listen, but I should like to make one comment. The Soviet representative has asked that a letter from a Mr. Stibi be circulated as a Conference document.^{2/} I should like to make it clear that, as far as my

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1

^{2/} Circulated as document ENDC/124

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delegation is concerned, this letter is from a non-governmental representative or organization and as such should be treated in accordance with the procedures governing such communications.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As far as the delegation of the Soviet Union is concerned we regard the document issued today as having been submitted by a Government with which many countries of the world maintain normal diplomatic relations, and it should be dealt with accordingly.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 163rd meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. L.C.N. Obi, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union tabled a document containing amendments to the Soviet Union draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 6 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

